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Abstract
Do radical political demands increase the risk of ethnic civil conflict? And why do
ethnic movements make radical demands in the first place? We contend that when
movements are fragmented, individual organizations use far-reaching claims relative
to the status quo to attract attention from the government, boost intra-
organizational discipline, and outbid rivals. Yet, such radical claims also increase
the risk of conflict escalation. We test our arguments at both the ethnic group and
organizational levels, using a new dataset on ethno-political organizations and their
political demands. Our results show that the scope of demands increases the more
organizations exist within an ethnic movement and that radical demands increase the
risk of civil conflict onset. This effect is specific to the dyadic government-movement
interaction, irrespective of other ethnic groups in the country. Moreover, at the
organizational level, radicalization in demands increases the likelihood that an
organization becomes engaged in civil conflict.
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In October 2017, the latent conflict between the Cameroonian government and
Anglophone opposition groups escalated into deadly violence, causing hundreds
of fatalities. After initial calls for language and administrative rights in the Anglo-
phone regions were resisted by the government, the dissidents made further demands
for political autonomy and an independent Anglophone state of “Ambazonia,” pro-
voking heavy-handed government repression. Do radical political demands increase
the risk of ethnic civil conflict? And why do ethnic movements make radical
demands in the first place? Recent research highlights the impact of actor fragmen-
tation (Cunningham 2013) and organizational rivalries (Cunningham, Bakke, and
Seymour 2012; Krause 2014; Pearlman 2008/09) on conflict dynamics, but has not
analyzed in depth how radicalization in opposition demands intervenes in these
processes. Similarly, existing studies show an effect of inter-group inequality on
ethnic civil conflict (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Stewart 2008), but do
not consider how claims made by marginalized groups affect the escalation process
leading from inequality to conflict outbreak.
To address this gap, we develop a theory of conflict escalation in ethno-political
mobilization that highlights the importance of claims as signaling devices within
opposition movements and in their interaction with state governments. With a higher
number of organizations within an ethnic movement, individual organizations have
incentives to make radical claims to attract attention and possible concessions from
the government. In the face of movement-internal competition, radical claims also
serve to boost intra-organizational discipline and outbid contenders for the same
popular support. Yet, such radical claims increase the risk of violent conflict escala-
tion through the perceived threat to the government, by empowering hardliners on
the government side, and by provoking repressive measures that may fuel anti-
government violence.
Our study is the first to measure the scope of political demands at the level of
individual organizations, including both violent and non-violent organizations, in a
globally representative sample. We define the scope of demands as a function of
distance from the status quo on two different dimensions: governmental power and
territorial rights. The larger this distance, the more radical the demand is. We
introduce a new dataset on ethno-political organizations, EPR-Organizations
(EPR-O), which covers a random sample of forty countries over the period 1946
to 2013 and identifies individual organizations representing groups in the Ethnic
Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Vogt et al.
2015), as well as their distinct claims. These data allow us to examine the causes and
consequences of radical demands at the levels of both ethnic groups and organiza-
tions. Since EPR-O covers both violent and non-violent actors, we can track the
political demands of organizations that never become involved in violence, as well
as organizations’ claims before they engage in violence, and thus evaluate how the
scope of demands affects the risk of ethnic civil conflict.
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Our empirical analysis of the roots of radicalization shows that the scope of
demands increases as a function of the number of organizations within an ethnic
movement. This implies that although most comparative research conceives of
radicalization as observed escalation in violence (e.g., Bloom 2004; Cunningham,
Bakke, and Seymour 2012; Lawrence 2010), claims constitute an important element
of inter-organizational outbidding dynamics, as highlighted in many case studies
(e.g., Haines 1995; Kaufman 1996). Moreover, the risk of ethnic civil conflict is
higher the more radical the demands of an ethnic movement relative to the status
quo. We also find that the risk of civil conflict increases due to escalation in the
dyadic government-movement interaction rather than potential future imitators.
Finally, we find evidence of an organization-specific effect of radicalization; as
demands become more radical, an organization is more likely to become engaged
in civil conflict. Together, these findings provide new insights into the causal path-
ways that lead from previously identified risk factors to ethnic civil conflict.
Ethnic Mobilization, Actor Fragmentation, and Civil Conflict
Although many scholars emphasize how ethnic mobilization can fuel violent con-
flict (Brancati 2006; Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972), most ethno-
political disputes do not give way to violence. Existing research has considered both
structural and actor-centered approaches to explain non-violent and violent conflict
and how the former may escalate into the latter (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017; Vogt
2019). Yet, the role of specific claims made by political actors in such escalation has
largely been ignored.
For instance, one important strand of research argues that politically excluded or
economically marginalized groups are especially likely to rebel against the state
(Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Stewart 2008). These arguments postulate
a process of group mobilization running from inequality to violence (e.g., Cederman,
Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, 44-48), but while acknowledging the importance of
organizations in engendering collective action (e.g., Vogt 2019, 61-73), they do not
consider the impact of organizational claims and within-group competition on the
risk of escalation. From this perspective, claims advanced on behalf of ethnic groups
should simply reflect the grievances, which follow from structural inequalities.
Other studies treat opposition claims as a function of mobilization capacity and
bargaining leverage (e.g., Cetinyan 2002; Jenne, Saideman, and Lowe 2007). For
example, Cetinyan (2002) argues that under perfect information, an ethnic move-
ment should make demands on the state proportional to its capability. However,
there are often important information asymmetries between government and oppo-
sition movements (Walter 2009), and opposition claims can play an important role in
creating or exploiting such asymmetries.
Recent work extends bargaining models beyond unitary actors and considers the
role of internal divisions within the main antagonists. One key finding is that frag-
mented political movements are more likely to engage in violence against the state
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than unitary movements because fragmentation raises uncertainty and exacerbates
commitment problems (Cunningham 2013). While providing crucial insights into
how violence is affected by power struggles and alliances between and within
organizations (Christia 2012; Krause 2014; Pearlman 2008/09), these studies also
disregard the specific claims made by conflict actors. This makes it difficult to
directly test many proposed accounts of conflict escalation. To illustrate, Cunning-
ham (2013, 661) notes that “[b]argaining breaks down when the state is unable or
unwilling to satisfy the demands of the opposition.” This raises the question of what
demands the state cannot or will not concede.
Moreover, claims can also play a crucial role in movement-internal signaling. For
instance, existing studies conceptualize outbidding as organizations’ escalating use
of violence (e.g., Bloom 2004; Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012; Lawrence
2010). Yet, theories of ethnic outbidding suggest that organizations can also outbid
each other through the scope of their claims (e.g., Horowitz 1985, 185-228;
Kaufman 1996). Similarly, social movement scholars have highlighted the role
of movement factions’ objectives and rhetoric in their analyses of “radical flanks”
(e.g., Gamson 1975, 46-49; Haines 1995). Some studies have collected data on the
content of conflicts, such as the Religion and Armed Conflict data (Svensson and
Nilsson 2018), or the motivations and ideologies of non-state actors, such as the
MAROB dataset (Wilkenfeld, Asal, and Pate 2011). Yet, these works typically
assume certain claims a priori to be particularly prone to violence, especially reli-
gious or territorial demands (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Hassner 2009; Svensson
2007; Toft 2002, 2007; Walter 2006). This overlooks important variation in the
scope of demands within the same type of conflict issue.
In contrast, we argue that the most relevant factor is how far political demands
depart from the status quo, independent of the particular issue at stake. We define
demands as radical when they call for far-reaching changes to the status quo. Thus,
we propose a relational operationalization of the scope of demands.1 For example, a
demand for more regional autonomy is more radical in a highly centralized state than
in a federal state, and demands for inclusion that are radical in a highly exclusionary
state may represent the status quo in another state. We apply our operationalization
to a theory of how radical claims affect bargaining with the state in ethno-political
conflicts.
Signaling and Outbidding: A Claim-based Theory of Ethnic
Conflict Escalation
We develop a two-stage argument about the crucial signaling function of claims in
ethnic conflict that elucidates, first, why organizations expect radical demands to
deliver club benefits in the face of movement-internal competition and, second, how
these same signals—though potentially beneficial for individual organizations—can
produce negative externalities for the whole movement in the form of armed civil
conflict. We distinguish between the overall movement representing an ethnic group
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and individual organizations, which are typically concerned with both public goods
for their ethnic constituency and club goods that exclusively accrue to themselves
(Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012; Krause 2014). In this setting, organiza-
tions use claims to signal strength and resolve to three key audiences: the state
government, their members, and their broader ethnic constituency.
Since opposition organizations’ interactions with the state government are
fraught by information asymmetries, they typically have incentives to exaggerate
their strength to obtain more concessions from the government (Walter 2009,
249-50). More radical demands can help an organization appear more committed
in bargaining with the state. Moreover, political demands are a core ingredient of
ideology and, therefore, play a key role in both mobilizing popular support and
establishing organizational cohesion. Ideological doctrines help mobilize individu-
als for collective action by distinguishing in-groups from out-groups, establishing
goals, and providing a road map for action (Costalli and Ruggeri 2015; Drake 1998).
Within organizations, they also serve to homogenize individual motivations,
develop internal control mechanisms, and, thus, promote intra-organizational disci-
pline (Gutiérrez Sanı́n and Wood 2014; Thaler 2012). Since radical demands are
likely to sharpen ideological profiles, ethno-political organizations may advance
such demands in order to boost external support and internal cohesion.2
These incentives should increase with a higher number of different organizations
representing the same ethnic group.3 First, vis-à-vis the government, radical
demands can allow individual organizations to gain prominence in bargaining, com-
pared to other organizations, and secure individual benefits. Second, in the compe-
tition for popular support within the movement’s constituency, radical demands
allow organizations to distinguish themselves from movement-internal competitors
and portray themselves as the most committed group representatives (Horowitz
1985, 185-228; Kaufman 1996; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). Similar to the cen-
trifugal force affecting political candidates in party-internal contests (e.g., Adams
and Merrill 2008; Owen and Grofman 2006), increasing competition over the same
“market” of supporters incentivizes ethno-political organizations to send more rad-
ical signals. For example, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA, Homeland and Liberty) and
its political wing Herri Batasuna (Popular Unity) have rejected any form of auton-
omy short of full independence, thereby distancing themselves from the mainstream
Basque Nationalist Party, which accepts an autonomous Basque province within
Spain.
Finally, the emergence of competitors representing the same ethnic constituency
also threatens organizations’ internal cohesion by raising the specter of members’
defection to rival organizations. For example, competition over recruits has been a
key element of rivalry between different Islamist organizations in Somalia (Ahmad
2016). For the purposes of internal communication, then, making radical demands
that accentuate their ideological profile can help organizations “distinguish them-
selves from rival organizations, allowing for long-term internal cohesion in the face
of the enemy” (Ugarriza and Craig 2013, 468). Therefore, we expect the scope of
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ethnic group demands to increase as a function of the number of organizations
representing the group.4 This first stage of our argument is expressed in the follow-
ing hypothesis:
H1: The higher the number of organizations representing an ethnic group, the
greater the scope of the ethnic movement’s demands.
However, while benefiting individual organizations, radical demands also
increase the risk of bargaining failure with the state and escalation to violence.
There are at least two mechanisms that lead from radical demands to civil conflict
outbreak. First, opposition demands affect the government’s threat perception and,
by extension, resort to repression (Davenport 2007). Opposition movements with
demands far away from the status quo pose a greater threat to the current order, and
governments have reason to assume that movements will escalate toward even more
radical demands in the future. This undermines the confidence of the government in
the willingness of the movement’s representatives to compromise and furthers the
cause of hardliners on the government side who oppose negotiations. Moreover,
governments are likely to perceive movements with radical demands as prone to
radical action (Abrahms 2012). This may incite heavy-handed repression, which
often escalates anti-government mobilization (Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998). This
direct effect of the scope of demands on civil war risk is captured in the following
hypothesis:
H2a: The risk of armed civil conflict increases with the scope of an ethnic
movement’s demands.
The second mechanism leading from radical demands to civil conflict outbreak
runs through the government’s fear of setting precedents. Governments are partic-
ularly wary of giving in to far-reaching demands if they perceive a risk that others
will make similar demands in the future (Toft 2002; Walter 2006). The threat of
future demands increases the government’s resolve to block far-reaching demands at
the present. This effect is conditional as it depends on the existence, and the number,
of potential future imitators. Governments are likely to be more intransigent if they
have more potential future challengers (Walter 2006), which in turn increases the
risk of violent conflict escalation. Thus, one can extend the dyadic government-
movement interaction to the role of other ethnic movements in the country.
H2b: The likelihood that radical demands of an ethnic movement lead to
armed civil conflict increases with the number of other ethnic groups in the
state.
Finally, at the organizational level, claim-based radicalization should have a
direct impact on the risk of civil war as radicalizing organizations may turn to
political violence. As Jenne (2007, 15) argues, ethnic leaders’ claims lock
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organizations into mobilization, and increasingly radical demands raise their repu-
tation costs from backing down later. Radicalizing organizations might be pushed
toward violent action because they fear to jeopardize their standing within the
movement and its constituency if they do not follow through with their claims.
Hence, once introduced, radical demands often develop a life of their own, torpe-
doing the bargaining process and increasing the risk of violence between govern-
ments and challengers. This organization-level effect of radicalization leads us to
our last hypothesis:
H3: Radicalization of claims increases the likelihood that an organization
becomes engaged in armed civil conflict.
The EPR-Organizations (EPR-O) Dataset
We test our theoretical arguments with a new dataset on ethno-political organiza-
tions called EPR-Organizations. EPR-O identifies individual political organizations
representing ethnic groups listed in the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset
(Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Vogt et al. 2015). It currently includes a
stratified random sample of twenty conflict and twenty non-conflict countries, listed
in Table 1, from 1946 (or independence) to 2013.5 The dataset focuses on organi-
zations that represent groups at the national level, such as political parties, NGOs,
and self-determination organizations. The concept of an organization is defined
relatively broadly as any named non-state entity that recruits members and makes
political claims. Overall, the dataset contains 668 individual organizations that
represent 158 different ethnic groups (see Online Appendix I).
Organizations may be tied to ethnic groups through different mechanisms. For
example, some parties have an explicit ethnic identity in their name, while others
only have a manifested ethnic support base in elections. An organization can make
explicit ethno-political demands or simply be composed of individuals from a par-
ticular ethnic group. Thus, the EPR-O dataset defines ethnic organizations as orga-
nizations that represent the interests of specific ethnic groups, in opposition to other
ethnic groups in the country, (a) through explicit ethnic claims, (b) through recruit-
ment along ethnic group lines, or (c) through electoral support along ethnic lines.
Ethnic claims are defined as public demands in favor of the rights or well-being of
specific ethnic groups. Ethnic recruitment occurs when members overwhelmingly
join, or are admitted to, the organization because they are from particular ethnic
groups, while ethnic electoral support refers to voters’ overwhelmingly choosing a
given political party over other parties because they are from specific ethnic groups.
This broad definition allows us to detect ethnic organizations in distinct contexts,
using different signals of their ethnic base. We use “because” in the definition to
ensure that ethnic recruitment and support are not accidental (for example, a mere
function of demographics), but a conscious decision by the individuals supporting/
joining the organization.
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We relied on both primary and secondary sources to identify organizations and
determine their links to ethnic groups. Our “universe” of relevant political organi-
zations is composed of entries in the following four sources: i) election archives of
all national-level elections in the included countries between 1946 and 2013, ii) the
Political Handbooks of the World (Banks et al. 2014), iii) the World Directory of
Minorities and Indigenous Peoples (Minority Rights Group International 2007), and
iv) the Cunningham (2013) self-determination movement (SDM) dataset. This cov-
ers a broad spectrum of possible organizational goals (governmental vs. territorial)
and strategies (electoral and non-electoral; violent and non-violent). The full uni-
verse consisted of more than 2,600 political organizations. We then consulted a large
number of sources, including original documents and websites of organizations, as
well as scholarly texts, to decide whether a given organization could be associated
with one or more ethnic groups as specified above. An organization was only linked
to an ethnic group if at least one trustworthy source provided convincing evidence.
Organization-group linkages in EPR-O are many-to-many as each organization
could be linked to more than one ethnic group, while an ethnic group may be
represented by a single or several different organizations. For each organization-
group link the dataset provides yearly codings of the stated goals for the group and
the mobilization strategies employed to represent this group (e.g., use of violence).
We focus on two broad claims by ethnic organizations: governmental power and
Table 1. EPR-Organizations Sample.
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territorial rights. Governmental power refers to aspirations to achieve power or
influence for ethnic groups in the national government. Claims for territorial rights
include demands for regional autonomy and/or secession. We code demands from
explicit, public statements made by organizations and their leaders, as reported in the
main primary and/or secondary sources. Figure A1 in Online Appendix III plots the
relative frequency of these two broad claims at the organizational level over time.
Online Appendix II compares EPR-O to two alternative datasets on both violent
and non-violent ethno-political organizations in terms of coverage, organizations,
and key variables. For the purposes of this article, EPR-O has two main advantages.
First, the more diverse set of countries included in the random sample should provide
a better basis for generalizations than region-specific datasets, such as the Minorities
at Risk Organizational Behavior dataset (MAROB) (Wilkenfeld, Asal, and Pate
2011). Second, EPR-O features a more comprehensive list of organizations than the
Strategies of Resistance Data Project (SRDP), which is limited to states with self-
determination movements (Cunningham, Dahl, and Frugé 2017).6 For instance, for
Angola, EPR-O includes not only separatist organizations operating in Cabinda, but
also violent and non-violent organizations focusing on the interests of other ethnic
groups.7 This allows us to consider various dimensions when measuring the scope of
ethnic group claims.
Methodological Approach and Operationalization
Estimation Strategy
Following the structure of our argument, our empirical analysis proceeds in two
stages. We first test the relationship between movement fragmentation and the scope
of ethnic group demands (hypothesis H1) using ordered logistic regression models.
We then evaluate the effect of the scope of demands on ethnic civil conflict onset
with logistic regression models at both the ethnic group (hypotheses H2a and H2b)
and the organization levels (hypothesis H3). Our units of analysis are the ethnic-
group year and the organization year, respectively. For the onset analysis, we use the
King and Zeng (2001) rare events logit estimator and drop observations with
ongoing civil conflicts. We account for temporal dependence within ethnic groups
or organizations by a cubic polynomial of peace years (Carter and Signorino 2010).
The ordered logistic regression models contain k  1 lagged dummy variables
(where k is the number of possible outcomes), each one referring to a particular
value of the dependent variable in the preceding year.
With respect to conflict onset, organizations may make radical demands because
they anticipate violence, and if so, we may overestimate the actual effect of the
claims. Our main strategy to address this reverse causality concern is to explicitly
model the scope of demands in the first part of our analysis. If we find evidence for a
systematic effect of movement fragmentation on the scope of demands, even when
controlling for prior conflict, we can be more confident that movement demands are
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not mere reflections of initial conflict proneness, but rather the result of movement-
internal signaling and outbidding maneuvers, as suggested by our argument. More-
over, we use an additional indicator that records the scope of demands in the first
year of an ethnic group’s political mobilization. The average group mobilization
time before an ethnic civil conflict in our sample was over twenty years, long enough
to make it implausible for claims to merely reflect expected future armed conflict.
Measuring the Scope of Demands and Radicalization
We operationalize the scope of demands as their distance from the status quo. We
use the EPR-O dataset to determine the claims made by ethnic organizations regard-
ing governmental power and territorial rights, and identify the status quo using
information on ethnic groups’ access to national and regional-level executive power
from the EPR dataset. We determine the scope of claims by locating both claims and
status within a two-dimensional space of six fields and counting the distance in fields
between the claims and the status quo (see Figure 1). The total distance value is
given by the sum of horizontal and vertical moves necessary to get from the status
quo to organizational demands. The distance is coded as 0 if no claims are made
regarding governmental power and territorial rights.
On the governmental-power dimension (the horizontal axis in Figure 1), we focus
on whether ethnic groups are included in national-level executive power or
excluded, according to EPR. EPR codes ethnic groups as included if their political
leaders occupy non-token positions of power in the relevant organs of executive
power and exert influence on national policy (Vogt et al. 2015, 1331). The maximum
distance of demands from the status quo is 1 on this dimension. This is the case when
an organization representing an excluded ethnic group makes demands for access to
national-level power. On the territorial-rights dimension, we distinguish between no
territorial rights, regional autonomy within the existing state, and secession. In terms
of the status quo, the EPR dataset codes ethnic groups as having regional autonomy
if the state contains executive organs with decision-making power that operate
below the state level (for example, departments) but above the local level and if
group representatives exert actual influence within these organs (Vogt et al. 2015,
1331). The maximum distance of demands from the status quo is 2 on the territorial-
rights dimension, which is the case when organizations demand separatism in the
absence of any existing territorial rights.8
Figure 1 shows two hypothetical examples of the scope of demands within this
two-dimensional space. Organization a representing ethnic group A demands access
to governmental power as well as regional autonomy. Since group A currently is
neither included in the central government nor in regional executives, these claims
result in a scope value of 2, which results from a 1 on the governmental-power
dimension and a 1 on the territorial-rights dimension. Organization b makes claims
for secession on behalf of group B even though the group currently enjoys access to
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governmental power. This also results in a scope value of 2 on the territorial
dimension.
Hypotheses H1, H2a and H2b refer to the ethnic-group level and the demands
made by movements as a whole. Both the outbidding and the threat perception
mechanisms in our argument should be mainly driven by the most radical organi-
zation within an ethnic movement. Thus, we use the maximum organizational value
among all organizations representing an ethnic group in a given year as our
movement-level indicator of the scope of demands. We also present robustness tests
using the median value among all organizations, which should represent “average”
movement demands. We combine the two dimensions into one single indicator,
because from the perspective of the state government, the loss of power and/or
institutional changes resulting from demands on more than one dimension (for
example, providing regional autonomy to a group plus offering it access to central
government power) will be perceived as cumulative. Accordingly, we view the
distance from the status quo as cumulative. In additional robustness tests, we gauge
the separate effects of the governmental power and territorial rights measures on
ethnic civil conflict and use dummy variables for each value on the two dimensions.
Hypothesis H3 refers to the organization level and how the radicalization of




















Figure 1. Calculating distance from status quo at the organizational level.
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as an increase in the distance of demands from the status quo from one year to the
next. Hence, we test hypothesis H3 using a dummy variable indicating if an indi-
vidual organization increased its demands from one year to the next. In order to
minimize the risk of endogeneity, we lag the variable by one year, thus capturing
changes in the scope of demands from t–2 to t1.
Ethnic Civil Conflict Onset
The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset defines conflicts as a contested incom-
patibility over government or territory between two parties, of which one is the
government of a state and the other an organized non-state actor, resulting in at
least twenty-five battle-related deaths per year (Gleditsch et al. 2002). We treat
ethnic groups as experiencing a civil conflict if a rebel organization recruited fight-
ers from a particular ethnic group and made public claims on behalf of the group, as
coded in the ACD2EPR dataset (Wucherpfennig et al. 2012). Overall, the group-
level sample contains seventy ethnic civil conflict onsets (about 0.6 percent of all
ethnic-group years). At the organizational level, we identified the organizations in
EPR-O that are listed as civil conflict actors in the ACD data and coded a civil
conflict onset in the first year an organization appears in an ACD dyad. Overall, the
sample contains ninety-eight organizational onsets of civil conflict (about 0.8 per-
cent of all organization years).9
Movement Fragmentation
Following previous studies (Cunningham 2013; Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour
2012), we measure fragmentation by the logged number of EPR-O organizations that
claim to represent the ethnic group. In the organization-level analysis, we use an
indicator of the logged number of other organizations representing the same ethnic
group as the organization in question.
Control Variables
In the first stage of our analysis, we take into account a series of factors that could
influence both movement fragmentation and the scope of claims. The first set refers
to groups’ structural resources, and we include relative group size, the logged
number of trans-border ethnic kin connections, and a dummy variable for whether
a group is territorially concentrated from the EPR data. Moreover, we control for
intra-ethnic linguistic and religious divisions, using two counts of the number of
different linguistic and religious segments in an ethnic group from the EPR-ED data
(Bormann, Cederman, and Vogt 2017). Intra-ethnic cleavages and the degree of
territorial concentration can affect an ethnic group’s bargaining power and the scope
of claims (Cetinyan 2002; Jenne, Saideman, and Lowe 2007) as well as the propen-
sity for political fragmentation (Seymour, Bakke, and Cunningham 2016; Toft 2002;
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Weidmann 2009). Similarly, ethnic kin in neighboring states may increase material
support (Jenne 2007), but transnational assistance can also foster intra-group divi-
sions (Seymour, Bakke, and Cunningham 2016).10
The scope of demands made by ethnic groups obviously depends on the status
quo itself, and groups’ political situation might also affect their propensity for
fragmentation. Hence, our second set of controls refers to the political status quo
of the ethnic group, measured by three variables: first, a political exclusion dummy,
indicating whether the group lacks meaningful representation in government in a
given year, according to EPR; second, a regional autonomy dummy variable denot-
ing whether a group has meaningful representation in a sub-national executive
organ; and finally, a dummy variable that records whether an ethnic group was
downgraded in its EPR power status within the five years prior to the year in
question to consider changes in the status quo.
The third set of controls captures the characteristics and actions of the govern-
ment, which also affect both fragmentation and claim-making (Seymour, Bakke, and
Cunningham 2016). We control for the degree of democracy and economic devel-
opment as indicators of governments’ institutional and economic capacity to accom-
modate group demands, using V-Dem’s liberal democracy index (Coppedge et al.
2015) and a logged GDP per capita variable.
Previous studies suggest that the occurrence of violence increases the likelihood
of fragmentation (Asal, Brown, and Dalton 2012; Seymour, Bakke, and Cunning-
ham 2016), and such violence could also bolster the demands of movements. Hence,
our fourth set of control variables captures earlier instances of political violence
within a given government-movement dyad. First, we include the number of previ-
ous civil conflicts involving an ethnic group, based on the ACD2EPR dataset.
Second, we include a dummy variable that indicates whether a given ethnic move-
ment (or a given organization in the organization-level analysis) used violence
against the government below the threshold for civil conflict in the foregoing year,
based on the corresponding variable from the EPR-O dataset. At the organizational
level, we additionally control for whether the ethnic group as a whole was involved
in a civil conflict in the foregoing year.
Since both movement fragmentation and group claims might be influenced by the
strategic environment, our fifth set of controls takes into account other potential
challengers in a given country (Walter 2006). We control for both the logged number
of other politically relevant ethnic groups in the country, according to the EPR
dataset, and the demands made by these groups. The latter variable indicates for
each group year the average value of the scope of the demands made by all other
groups in the country. This should also help us distinguish the demands of a specific
movement from underlying country-level factors that may influence ethno-political
claim-making more generally. In addition, we consider a country’s logged popula-
tion size. Sixth, existing research highlights factionalized leadership as a source of
fragmentation (Asal, Brown, and Dalton 2012). While we cannot directly measure
movement-internal personal rivalries or strategic disagreements, we control for the
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duration of mobilization (i.e. the number of years since the establishment of a
group’s first political organization), assuming that internal rivalries and competition
should become more likely over time.
In the second stage of our analysis we also control for structural group resources,
existing inter-group inequality, the degree of democracy and economic capacity,
previous instances of political violence, the strategic environment, as well as mobi-
lization duration as these factors can all be expected to affect the likelihood of ethnic
civil conflict (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Gurr 1994; Jenne 2007;
Walter 2006). In addition, at the organizational level, the strength of an organization
could influence both radicalization and the risk of violent escalation. Following
previous studies, we consider the organization’s age as a proxy of its institutional
capacity (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Horowitz 2010). Finally, all models control
for time trends using a calendar year variable. Tables A1 and A2 in Online Appendix
III provide summary statistics of the main independent variables at both the group
and organization levels. All right-hand side variables are lagged by one year in the
statistical analysis.
Empirical Results
Movement Fragmentation and the Scope of Demands
We start our analysis with the relationship between internal fragmentation and
movement demands. Table 2 summarizes the regression results. We begin with a
parsimonious model that contains the fragmentation variable and three basic indi-
cators of groups’ structural resources. The effect of the logged number of organi-
zations is positive and statistically significant. This result does not change when we
add the rest of our control variables in Model 2. Model 3 restricts the sample to
ethnic group years with at least one political organization recorded in our dataset to
ensure that the observed effect of fragmentation on the scope of demands is not
simply a byproduct of mobilization itself. The effect of the logged number of
organizations becomes even somewhat stronger in this model. In substantive terms,
the predicted probability of an increase in the scope of demands from 0 to 1, from
1 to 2, and from 2 to 3 from one year to the next increases by about 17 percent,
27 percent, and 11 percent, respectively, when moving the fragmentation variable
from its minimum to its maximum value.11
Our sample includes a number of cases that aptly illustrate how internal frag-
mentation and the resulting inter-organizational competition can lead to increased
demands on state governments. For example, the National Awami Party/National
People’s Party (NAP), a leading Bengali organization in 1960s Pakistan mostly
composed of former Awami League members, first embraced a leftist-oriented,
multiethnic stance toward Bengali nationalism. It then shifted toward a more ethni-
cally based approach in its 1965 election manifesto, where it advanced its first claim
for full regional autonomy for East Pakistan. In turn, the Awami League issued its
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Table 2. Movement Fragmentation and the Scope of Demands. Regression Results.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
N organizations (logged) .12** .12* .14*
(.04) (.05) (.06)
Relative group size .46* .43 .01
(.23) (.43) (.58)
N of TEK connections (logged) .11 .04 .07
(.07) (.10) (.13)




Regional autonomy 1.01*** 1.70***
(.28) (.39)
Downgraded in last five years 1.34*** 1.78***
(.20) (.29)
Liberal democracy .80 .00
(.41) (.42)
GDP per capita .00 .13
(logged) (.09) (.09)
N of years of mobilization .02* .02*
(.01) (.01)
Use of small-scale violence by movement .36 .27
(.20) (.26)
Group’s conflict history .24 .20
(.13) (.14)
N of other groups in country (logged) .05 .17
(.10) (.14)
Scope of demands of other groups .20 .10
(.17) (.21)
Country population (logged) .02 .13
(.09) (.08)
Calendar year .01 .02**
(.01) (.01)
N of religious segments .14 .21
(.10) (.14)
N of linguistic segments .12 .24
(.12) (.16)
k  1 lagged outcome dummy variables Yes Yes Yes
Cut 1 5.27*** 5.00 21.12
(.41) (13.11) (11.75)
Cut 2 12.05*** 2.33 12.58
(.62) (12.86) (11.47)
(continued)
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own Six-Points Programme in 1966, which propagated a much more far-reaching
vision of a quasi-independent East Pakistan with the rights to issue its own currency,
collect its own taxes, and establish its own militia (Leonard 2006). Similarly, com-
petition over leadership within the Tatar movement between the Tatar Public Center
(TOTs, TPC), on one side, and the Ittifak Party and its Azatlyk youth organization,
on the other, contributed to increasingly greater demands for autonomy from Russia
at the beginning of the 1990s (Tanrisever 2002, 191-92).
Apart from movement fragmentation, the only other variables that have a rela-
tively consistent effect on the scope of ethnic group demands in these models are
territorial concentration, mobilization duration, and the three variables capturing a
group’s political status quo. Unsurprisingly, the longer mobilization lasts, the more
likely fragmentation becomes, presumably at least partly as a result of personal
competition over leadership (Asal, Brown, and Dalton 2012). Also, politically mar-
ginalized groups are more likely to make demands that are further from the status
quo. This suggests that, apart from the collective grievances that can be mobilized by
movement leaders, another mechanism leading from inter-group inequality to vio-
lent conflict escalation might be the tendency of marginalized groups to make
demands that appear radical to the ruling elite, thus increasing the risk of bargaining
breakdown. Finally, the positive effect of territorial concentration on the scope of
movement demands confirms the importance of group resources for claim-making
(Cetinyan 2002; Jenne, Saideman, and Lowe 2007). We find no systematic effect of
prior instances of political violence on the scope of movement demands, suggesting
that movement demands are unlikely to be mere reflections of the underlying con-
flict proneness of a given state-movement relationship.
Online Appendix IV presents a series of robustness tests, including the use of
fixed effects to neutralize unobserved heterogeneity at the movement level, as well
as dynamic indicators of radicalization and fragmentation to address concerns of
reverse causality. Moreover, our results using the median, rather than maximum,
organizational scope value mirror those in Table 2. Thus, internal fragmentation
seems to shift ethnic movements as a whole toward more radical claims, rather than
simply producing radical outliers. Overall, our results lend support to hypothesis H1
and the first stage of our argument.
Table 2. (continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Cut 3 19.22*** 10.08 4.19
(.80) (13.06) (11.60)
N 12,403 12,299 5,060
Log likelihood 1,062.50*** 988.21*** 642.53***
Note: Robust standard errors, with clustering on countries, in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01,
***p < 0.001.
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From Claims to Violence: Ethnic Civil Conflict Onset
Our conflict onset analysis first tests the direct effect of the scope indicator on civil
conflict outbreak at the ethnic group level (hypothesis H2a). We begin again with the
most parsimonious model. The results of Model 4 in Table 3 show that the scope of
demands has a positive and statistically significant effect, indicating a higher risk of
ethnic civil conflict the further the distance between demands and the status quo.
Model 5 adds the rest of our control variables. The coefficient of the scope indicator
decreases, but remains robustly related to the risk of ethnic civil conflict onset. This
finding does not change when we add country and year-fixed effects in Model 6,
suggesting that the result is unlikely to be driven by unobserved heterogeneity across
countries and time.
Figure 2 contextualizes the substantive effect of the scope indicator by comparing
it to that of other explanatory variables. Based on Model 5, the figure displays the
first differences in the predicted probability of conflict onset when moving any of
these variables from their minimum to their maximum value, while holding all other
variables constant at their mean, median, or mode. The associated increase in the risk
of ethnic civil conflict onset is relatively small (due to the low overall conflict risk in
the sample), but the scope measure has a larger effect than, for example, political
exclusion and the number of trans-border ethnic kin connections. Overall, these
results lend strong support to hypothesis H2a, suggesting that there is a direct effect
of the scope of movement demands on the risk of violent conflict escalation.
Model 7 tests the second mechanism leading from movement demands to civil
conflict outbreak, which runs through the government’s fear of setting precedents.
Since this effect of demands is conditional on potential future imitators, we include
an interaction term of our scope indicator with the logged number of other ethnic
groups in the country. Otherwise, the model is identical to Model 5. The results do
not support hypothesis H2b, as the interaction term remains insignificant. This
suggests that the effect of radical demands does not depend on the existence of
potential future imitators, but results from an escalation in the dyadic
government-movement interaction.
Beyond the demands made by ethnic movements, we find that politically
excluded groups and those whose political status was downgraded within the five
foregoing years have a significantly higher probability of ethnic civil conflict.
Hence, while the focus on the political demands advanced by ethnic movements
allows us to get closer to the causal mechanisms of conflict escalation, our results
also uphold earlier findings that emphasize the importance of group-level indicators
of horizontal inequality (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Gurr 1994;
Stewart 2008). In addition, support for a movement from ethnic kin in other states
makes an armed confrontation with the government more likely. This indicates that
group resources matter for the bargaining between states and ethnic movements and,
by extension, the risk of civil conflict outbreak (e.g., Cetinyan 2002; Jenne,
Saideman, and Lowe 2007).


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Interestingly, the count of the number of organizations within an ethnic move-
ment is only statistically significant in one of these models. Together with the results
from the first stage of our analysis, this suggests that the effect of fragmentation on
armed conflict found in previous studies (e.g., Cunningham 2013) works in part
through claim-making. Finally, we do not find any significant positive effect of the
scope of demands made by other groups in the country on the risk of ethnic civil
conflict. This indicates that the effect of our main explanatory variable is specific to
the group that advances such demands and not an artifact of underlying factors that
influence ethnic politics in a given country more generally.
Online Appendix V provides additional robustness tests. The results reveal that
the effect of the scope of demands pertains to both the governmental and territorial-
rights dimensions, which suggests that the risk of violent escalation is not confined
to conflicts over territory, as emphasized in previous studies (Cunningham, Bakke,
and Seymour 2012; Toft 2002; Walter 2006). Moreover, when using the first-year
scope indicator, the results confirm the direct effect of radical demands on ethnic
civil conflict outbreak: the larger the distance between the demands and the status
Figure 2. Substantive effects. Notes: Based on Model 5 in Table 3 and calculated with
simulation methods using Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). Graph shows first
differences in the predicted ethnic civil conflict risk when moving any of the independent
variables listed on the y-axis from their minimum to their maximum values. All other variables
held constant at their mean, median, or mode.
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quo in the first year of group mobilization, the higher the risk of subsequent conflict
outbreak.
This also points to two different scenarios of escalation in the dyadic government-
movement interaction (see Table A5 in Online Appendix V for examples). Some
ethnic movements advance their maximum demands at the very beginning of the
mobilization process. For example, the Karen National Union advanced secessionist
claims on behalf of the Kayin/Karen group in Myanmar from its foundation in the
latter half of the 1940s. The demands were met with intransigence by the newly
independent Burmese state, and latent tensions quickly escalated into outright war.
In Zimbabwe, ZAPU (and later ZANU) aimed at overturning White minority rule
from the outset. In response, the Southern Rhodesian government banned the orga-
nization and suppressed any public campaigns, ultimately forcing the African
nationalist movement to pursue its goals by violent means. This example also high-
lights how claims made by marginalized groups that appear radical to the ruling elite
(and thus provoke a backlash) can play a crucial role in the escalation process
leading from inter-group inequality to civil conflict outbreak.
In other cases, movements increase their demands over the course of mobiliza-
tion, which exacerbates tensions and may ultimately lead to outright armed confron-
tation. This was the case in the aforementioned example of Bengali mobilization in
Pakistan. Following the presentation of its 1966 Six-Points Programme, the Awami
League won a clear majority in East Pakistan in the 1970 elections. Threatened by
the prospects of East Pakistani separatism, Pakistan’s military intervened in the
coalition talks and cracked down on Bengali mobilization. This only served to
further increase grievances in East Pakistan, and the Awami League responded to
the army’s brutal repression by calling for a noncooperation movement, ultimately
leading to civil war and independence (Leonard 2006).
To evaluate the impact of such radicalization processes in more detail, we now
move to the organization-level analysis. Hypothesis H3 holds that as individual
organizations increase their demands, they should be more likely to become engaged
in civil conflict. The results of Model 8 in Table 3 lend support to this hypothesis.
The dummy variable capturing organization-specific radicalization exerts a positive
and statistically significant effect on the risk of ethnic civil conflict onset. Thus, our
results provide evidence for a direct effect of radicalization on ethnic civil conflict
onset: increasingly radical demands tend to push organizations toward violent
action. This finding remains robust when we add country and year-fixed effects in
Model 9.
In addition, the results show that older organizations are more likely to become
involved in civil violence. Given that age tends to be associated with higher insti-
tutional capacity, this finding again underlines the important role of opposition
resources. Unsurprisingly, the use of small-scale violence against the government
either at the movement or the organization level increases the likelihood of civil
conflict. By contrast, an individual organization is less likely to take up arms against
the government if the group it represents was already engaged in an ethnic civil
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conflict in the foregoing year. This mirrors recent evidence that individual organi-
zations have an incentive to diversify their strategies compared to movement-
internal competitors (Cunningham, Dahl, and Frugé 2017). Importantly, the robust
effect of our radicalization indicator implies that increasingly radical demands
advanced by specific organizations have an independent impact over and beyond
the effect of prior instances of violence within the government-movement dyad. In
short, our results suggest that advancing increasingly radical demands locks ethno-
political organizations into a spiral of escalation that increases the risk of armed civil
conflict.
Conclusions
Almost three decades ago, Diehl (1992) criticized international conflict research for
disregarding the content of disputes. The same observation applies to current civil
war research. Recent studies of civil violence have advanced our knowledge of actor
fragmentation, power relations, and alliances in conflict dynamics and the role of
ideology in armed group behavior. Yet, the neglect of conflict actors’ claims in
quantitative research has left us without systematic evidence on many important
mechanisms of conflict escalation highlighted by existing theories and case studies.
We have argued that in addition to genuine group aspirations, demands advanced on
behalf of ethnic groups can serve as organization-external and internal signaling
devices. Especially in the context of fragmented movements, individual organiza-
tions and their leaders have incentives to use radical demands to signal strength to
the state, boost intra-organizational cohesion, and outbid movement-internal rivals –
with important negative externalities for the bargaining process with the govern-
ment. On the one hand, far-reaching demands by opposition movements likely affect
governments’ threat perception. On the other hand, organizations that make increas-
ingly radical demands lock themselves into a spiral of escalation, afraid of paying
the reputation costs from backing down.
We find empirical support for a strong positive relationship between movement
fragmentation and the scope of ethnic group demands, as well as a direct effect of the
latter and of organization-specific radicalization on the risk of civil violence. Polit-
ical demands are always the result of environmental circumstances and thus inher-
ently endogenous, but our empirical results point to an independent effect of the
scope of demands. While we cannot definitively rule out possible reverse causation,
this concern is mitigated by the fact that far-reaching demands at the outset of
groups’ mobilization still have a clear impact on the risk of civil conflict many years
later. We also show that prior ethnic civil conflict does not systematically increase
the scope of movement demands, suggesting that the latter is not just a function of
the underlying conflict proneness of a given state-movement relationship. Although
the EPR-O dataset is currently limited to forty countries, the random sampling
approach makes it unlikely that the findings suffer from systematic biases, and if
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anything the limited number of observations raises the bar for finding statistically
significant results.
Overall, our results support our claim that radical demands reflect deliberate
choices made by political organizations and their leaders. This is in line with
actor-centered arguments from studies of social movements, which emphasize the
importance of political agency above and beyond structural conditions (e.g., Sharp
2005; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). Our findings also contribute to recent studies
of ethnic grievances and civil conflict, which have mostly focused on measuring
objective horizontal inequality, rather than the concrete demands that ethnic orga-
nizations advance in response to such inequality (e.g., Cederman, Wimmer, and Min
2010; Stewart 2008; Vogt 2019). By confirming the relevance of claims in ethnic
outbidding (Horowitz 1985, 185-228; Kaufman 1996; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972),
we provide new insights into the complex processes of escalation from objective
inequality to the outbreak of ethnic civil conflict. Contrary to extant research on
issue indivisibility and conflict escalation (e.g., Hassner 2009; Svensson 2007; Toft
2007), we have shown that, independent of the particular dimension of political
claim-making, demands that are further away from the status quo are likely to be
perceived as more radical and, thus, to increase the risk of violent conflict escalation.
Hence, our study also feeds into the long-standing debate on the political conse-
quences of radicalism, which has typically focused on the achievement of movement
goals (e.g., Gamson 1975; Haines 1995; McCammon, Bergner, and Arch 2015).
Applying a new measure of radical demands to a global sample of a particular type
of movements, we show that in the context of ethno-political mobilization, the
negative social externalities are likely to outweigh potential organization or
movement-level gains in the form of funding or political success. Yet, organizations
could also attempt to raise their own profile through moderation, that is, by
“underbidding” their movement-internal rivals’ demands. For instance, social move-
ment scholars have shown that “radical flanks” often only emerge as such once other
factions strategically downscale their demands to secure individual benefits from the
state and third parties (e.g., McCammon, Bergner, and Arch 2015). Thus, one
promising avenue for future research using the new EPR-Organizations dataset
would be a systematic analysis of the causes and consequences of de-escalation in
terms of movement demands: why and when individual organizations downscale
their claims and how such moderation affects the strategic interactions with the state
government and the risk of armed conflict.
Finally, our approach could also inform research on radicalization in the field of
terrorism studies (e.g., McCauley and Moskalenko 2017; Moghaddam 2005). In line
with previous works in this field (Abrahms 2012; Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Piazza
2009), we find that the publically declared goals of organizations have an important
impact on conflict dynamics. This implies that the process of radicalization can be
conceptually captured partly by increases in the scope of political goals. Recent
psychological research argues that “radicalization of opinion” and “radicalization
of action” may be separate processes for individuals (McCauley and Moskalenko
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2017). The results of our study suggest that outbidding is a crucial mechanism at the
organizational level that leads from one to the other.
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Notes
1. Walter (2017) proposes a relational approach to measuring extremism, but her discussion
remains focused on religion. Zuber and Szöcsik (2015) measure the scope of demands by
ethnonational minority parties in Europe relative to the party system average.
2. Walter (2017) makes a similar argument with respect to religious extremism.
3. The fragmentation of ethnic movements is in itself an important political outcome that
has been analyzed in previous studies (e.g., Asal, Brown, and Dalton 2012; Seymour,
Bakke, and Cunningham 2016). Given that the sources of fragmentation might also affect
the scope of movements’ claims, we return to this issue in the control variables section
below.
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4. In principle, organizations could also attempt to distinguish themselves from movement-
internal competitors through moderation. We will return to this issue in the conclusion.
5. The sample is drawn from the universe of countries in the EPR dataset.
6. The SRDP is based on Cunningham’s (2013) SDM dataset, which records self-
determination organizations in 24 out of the 40 countries included in EPR-O. In these
twenty-four states, EPR-O features an average of 22.6 organizations per country, com-
pared to an average of 15.1 in the SDM dataset.
7. Figure A1 in Online Appendix III also shows that in the majority of years, less than
50 percent of all organizations contained in EPR-O made claims relating to territorial rights.
8. Note that organizations can also simultaneously make claims for both secession and
access to national-level power in the existing state. For example, the latter can be seen
as a short-term goal, with the long-term objective of attaining an independent state. Or
organizations might aim to achieve influence in the government in order to destabilize
existing state institutions from within (similar to anti-system parties) in the hope that this
facilitates their secessionist attempts.
9. The difference in the number of conflict onsets stems from the fact that a civil conflict
may involve two or more rebel organizations.
10. While it would be preferable to measure external (military) support more directly, the
only such global data we are aware of stem from the MAR project (Minorities at Risk
Project 2009). Yet, they only cover part of the ethnic groups included in our sample. Thus,
following the existing literature (e.g., Saideman 1997), we use trans-border ethnic kin
connections as an indicator of the external support potential.
11. The predicted probabilities were calculated with simulation methods using Clarify (King,
Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). All other variables were held constant at their mean,
median, or mode.
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